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Abstract
The adaptation process of a species to a new environment is a significant area of study
in biology. As part of natural selection, adaptation is a mutation process which improves
survival skills and reproductive functions of species. Here, we investigate this process
by combining the idea of incompetence with evolutionary game theory. In the sense of
evolution, incompetence and training can be interpreted as a special learning process.
With focus on the social side of the problem, we analyze the influence of incompetence on
behavior of species. We introduce an incompetence parameter into a learning function in
a single-population game and analyze its effect on the outcome of the replicator dynam-
ics. Incompetence can change the outcome of the game and its dynamics, indicating its
significance within what are inherently imperfect natural systems.
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory, first introduced in 1973 by Maynard Smith and Price, analyses
interactions between different populations of animals or their offspring during their lives, and
has since become an area of ongoing research interest [29, 5, 10, 32]. It aims to answer the
important ecological question of which population (or strategy) is the most stable from invasion
by mutants. As a part of natural selection, adaptation can be a mutation process which
improves survival skills and reproductive functions of species. This paper aims to provide a
novel approach to adaptation processes in new environments from the social point of view. This
is achieved by introducing the notion of incompetence, whereby players may be imperfect in
executing their strategies. Hence evolutionary dynamics are considered under the assumption
that species improve their level of competence according to a prescribed learning scheme.
A classical assumption in evolutionary game theory is that any player in a game chooses
a strategy from a strategy set and executes it with probability one. However, this assumption
may be overly simplistic for a realistic model, because players might not be experts in their
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preferred actions. For example, if a fight between a young and an aged lion unfolds, we could
not predict the real outcome of the game as the experienced lion may be more skillful and
less prone to errors than the young one, even if lacking in youthful vigor. This corresponds to
potential mistakes in executing strategies. Mathematically, this means that the probability of
executing a chosen strategy would be less than one.
In the context of evolutionary games, the idea of allowing players to make errors is not
entirely new. It has been described in many different ways: as a mutation process alone
[9, 30], a process of language learning [16, 17, 25], different experimental learning processes
[8, 11, 23, 27], adaptation dynamics [21], and as environmental noise [4, 22]. In addition, the
unpredictability of some model aspects (such as behavioral or environmental “noise”) may be
approximated by taking into consideration the perturbations of different parameters. This
approximation is also related to the idea of players who make small errors, called “trembling
hands” [26], and as a result of these effects, stability of the equilibria is affected. An attempt to
generalize perturbations caused by players’ mistakes, in the sense of behavioral errors in normal
form games, was made by Beck et al. in their paper Incompetence and impact of training in
bimatrix games [3], and in Beck’s PhD thesis Incompetence, training and changing capabilities
in game theory [2] for matrix and bimatrix stationary games.
In parallel to evolutionary game theory, the dynamical systems perspective is frequently
adopted via the analysis of the associated replicator equations [31]. The behavior of the replica-
tor dynamics depends on initial conditions, parameters’ values and the structure of the payoff
matrix, and have been extensively studied [5, 6, 24, 32]. However, there is no existing research
examining the behavior of replicator dynamics under incompetence.
1.1 Mathematical Background for Replicator Dynamics
There are many approaches for establishing long run scenarios for evolutionary games. A
fundamental set of replicator equations was proposed by Taylor and Jonker in [31]. Consider
the fitness matrix R = [rij], i, j = 1, . . . , n. Let x = (xi) denote the frequency of strategy i.
Then the expected payoff (or fitness) of strategy i is defined by the formula
fi =
n∑
j=1
xjrij = e
T
i Rx = (Rx)i, (1)
where ei is the i-th vector in the unit basis. The average fitness payoff of the population is then
defined by the scalar
φ =
n∑
i=1
xifi = x
TRx. (2)
The appealing replicator equation capturing the dynamics of the strategy i is then postu-
lated to be
x˙i = xi(fi − φ), i = 1, ..., n,
or in matrix form
x˙i = xi
(
(Rx)i − xTRx
)
, i = 1, ..., n. (3)
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1.2 Mathematical Background to Incompetence
To incorporate incompetence, let us now consider a matrix game with a n×n payoff matrix R.
In a classical sense, each player chooses an action (a pure strategy) and that choice results in
a deterministic payoff: there is an underlying assumption that players are able to execute the
actions that they have chosen. However, when incompetence is introduced this is no longer the
case [2].
Incompetence is incorporated into the game by assigning probabilities that the actions
selected by players will not coincide with the executed actions. The set of all such probabilities
determines the incompetence matrix for each player. Let q(Aj|Ai) be the probability that
player 1 executes action Aj given that he selects action Ai. Obviously, for any chosen action the
probabilities of all possible executed actions sum to 1, that is
∑n
j=1 q(Aj|Ai) = 1, ∀i = 1, ..., n,
and 0 ≤ q(Aj|Ai) ≤ 1, ∀i, j. The set of all these probabilities for player 1 makes up his
incompetence matrix Q:
Q =

q(A1|A1) q(A2|A1) ... q(An|A1)
q(A1|A2) q(A2|A2) ... q(An|A2)
...
...
. . .
...
q(A1|An) q(A2|An) ... q(An|An)
 . (4)
Note that Q is a stochastic matrix. We assume that the incompetence matrix for the second
player is a transpose matrix of the first player, as both of them are from the same population.
Now, we can construct a matrix game with incompetence. Suppose that the two players
independently select actions i and k, then the probability that this results in executed actions
j and h respectively is
p(Aj, Ah|Ai, Ak) = q(Aj|Ai)q(Ah|Ak).
In order to simplify notation, instead of q(Aj|Ai), we will now use the notation qij. The
expected reward can therefore be determined as a function of the selectable strategies as
rQik =
n∑
j=1
n∑
h=1
p(Aj, Ah|Ai, Ak)rjh =
n∑
j=1
n∑
h=1
qijqkhrjh, (5)
and the values rQik define the entries of the payoff matrix R
Q.
The matrix form of (4) gives the relationship
RQ = QRQT . (6)
To define players’ incompetence, we introduce an incompetence parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] which
measures the training progress of players on the trajectory from the “starting” level of incom-
petence, S, to the “final” level of incompetence, F . These trajectories can be of any type. In
order to simplify the analysis we shall initially consider a linear trajectory such as:
Q(λ) = (1− λ)S + λF, λ ∈ [0, 1]. (7)
Here both S and F are also stochastic matrices. In some cases, F will be an identity matrix
indicating the final level of full competence. We use simply R(λ) to notate a new incompetent
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fitness matrix from (6). Note that, R(0) = SRST , R(1) = FRF T , and hence R(1) = R if
F = I.
The key questions here are to discover the rules of how to adapt in the most efficient way,
and determine if there are any critical points, λc, on the adaptation trajectory of the population.
Such critical points may determine the adequate level of adaptation, after which species do not
have to improve their survival skills.
In the next section we introduce the idea of incompetence in the classical replicator dynam-
ics. In Section 3 we demonstrate how this adaptation process affects the selection outcome of
the classical Hawk-Dove game. Then, in Section 4 we provide results that can be used when
analyzing evolutionary games under incompetence to examine the influence of incompetence on
the outcome of the replicator dynamics. Finally, we demonstrate our results on the extended
Hawk-Dove-Retaliator game in Section 5.
2 Evolutionary dynamics under incompetence
Let us now consider how probabilities of mistakes may describe interaction errors in an evolu-
tionary context. At first, one can imagine that a particular population of species is immersed
into a new environment; this could be described by a natural or anthropogenic migration pro-
cess. Assume that there are only a finite number, n, of available behavioral strategies for each
species. Two individuals interact by choosing and executing strategies, and achieve payoffs,
defined by the n × n matrix R. Next, we also assume that each individual may choose any
action from the available set of strategies. We assume that in the new habitat they make errors,
executing different strategies from the ones that they chose, with probabilities qij, where i and
j are varying from 1 to n. The set of all conditional probabilities qij for the population makes
up its incompetence matrix Q from (4).
Thus, whenever two individuals interact, they may both change their behavior from one
strategy to another during the execution of the play. Assume that both opponents are able
to determine each other’s selected strategy. This is a natural assumption as species are able
to “recognise” other species’ behavior by their body language. However, even if the opponent
has chosen one particular strategy, there is a chance for them to execute another according to
the experience or competence in the strategy choice. Hence, each species from the population
achieves an expected payoff for chosen strategy i whenever their opponent chooses strategy k
according to (5) or, in simplified notation
rik(λ) =
n∑
j=1
n∑
h=1
qij(λ)qhk(λ)rjh, i, k = 1, .., n, (8)
where qij(λ) denotes the (i, j)
th entry of Q(λ).
2.1 Replicator dynamics under incompetence
Now we can introduce the adaptation dynamics into the evolution of the population. Here, the
adaptation process of a population to a new environment can be constructed as interactions
between the environment’s individuals, which over time reduce their probabilities of making
errors, that is, as λ changes from 0 to 1. Then, according to (1)-(3), for a new matrix game
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under incompetence given by R(λ), one may write down the following equations of the expected
fitness for strategy i
fi(λ) =
n∑
j=1
rij(λ)xj = e
T
i R(λ)x, (9)
and for the mean fitness payoff of the population
φ(λ) =
n∑
i=1
xifi(λ) = x
TR(λ)x. (10)
Hence, the replicator dynamics are given by
x˙i = xi(fi(λ)− φ(λ)), i = 1, ..., n,
or in a matrix form
x˙i = xi((R(λ)x)i − xTR(λ)x). (11)
Thus we obtain a dynamic system (11), where R(λ) is quadratic in λ. An important feature
of these systems is that the time scale of replicator dynamics for x(t) might not coincide with
the time scale of adaptation dynamics for λ. This means that individuals may study the
environment much faster or much slower than they reproduce. Indeed, we begin our analysis
of the dynamics of the system with λ fixed, with the goal of discovering the underlying effect
of the incompetence parameter.
In a strict sense, the new system given by (11) is a perturbed evolutionary game, and
perturbations depend on the parameter λ. As λ tends to 1 the game under incompetence gets
closer to the original game given by R.
3 Motivating example: a Hawk-Dove game
In his book [28], Maynard Smith analyzed the basic example of evolutionary game theory which
is called “The Hawk-Dove game”. In this game, the interaction between two bird types, of Hawk
(H) and Dove (D), is observed. In a generic interaction, these birds need to divide some resource
of value b, for example, territory or food. If they are both from the Hawk population, then
they fight and lose some resource of value c, perhaps representing a cost of injury, and divide
the rest of the resource in half. If they are both Dove, then they simply divide the resource
without any losses. If Hawk and Dove interact, then Hawk captures the resource and Dove
receives nothing. The payoff matrix here is given by
R =
 b−c2 b
0 b
2
 .
The first row and column correspond to the Hawk strategy while the second row and
column denote the Dove strategy. It is a well-studied example and it was shown that the result
depends on the structure of the payoff matrix. In particular, if the price of injury is high, then
stable coexistence is possible. Otherwise, we obtain the situation when the aggressive strategy
dominates the passive one.
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One particular example to illustrate this game is an interaction between a naturally ag-
gressive person and a passive one. It can be easily imagined that the passive person is inclined
to be scared and might run away when he or she becomes a victim of aggression. Obviously,
a fight in response to the aggression is not the action that is expected from aggressive. On
the other hand, the aggressive person is expected to fight no matter what the circumstances
are. However, we might observe that in some cases the passive person could fight back with
extra aggression, whereas, the aggressive person can become frightened and run away. This
behavioral unpredictability may be more likely when players are in a new environment with
which they are unfamiliar.
Next, we construct an incompetent case of the Hawk-Dove game with the reward matrix
R(λ) calculated from (6)-(7). Consider the case when stable coexistence of two strategies is
possible with b = 2 and c = 4. Then,
R =
( −1 2
0 1
)
.
Here Dove and Hawk stably coexist and there exists a unique stable frequency of Hawks,
xH , which is given by xH =
b
c
= 1
2
.
The game is described via one payoff matrix for both players: for the first player the matrix
is R, and for the second player the matrix is RT , and if we assume that players from the same
population are equally incompetent, then only one matrix (Q,QT ) measures players’ level of
incompetence. Consider the starting incompetence level S as
S =
(
0.3 0.7
0.6 0.4
)
,
and obtain Q(λ) from (4)
Q(λ) =
(
0.7λ+ 0.3 0.7− 0.7λ
0.6− 0.6λ 0.6λ+ 0.4
)
.
We use a simplification of the reward matrix with 0 on the diagonal from
R˜(λ) = R(λ)− dR(λ)uT , (12)
where dR(λ) is a column-vector consisting of the diagonal elements of R(λ), u is a column-
vector of ones. This formula helps to simplify replicator dynamics as it is known that this
transformation does not affect the dynamics [32]. The reward matrix R˜(λ) then can be written
as
R˜(λ) =
(
0 1.56λ2 − 0.62λ+ 0.06
1.82λ2 − 0.94λ+ 0.12 0
)
.
It can be easily shown that there are three possible situations depending on the value of λ.
The first is if Hawk and Dove stably coexist: thus, there exists a stable equilibrium
xH =
6λ− 1
13λ− 3
and this is the case for λ ∈ [0, 1
6
)∪ (2
7
, 1]. We observe an interesting result when species achieve
the level of incompetence λ = 1
6
. Hawk become extinct and we obtain a population consisting of
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all Dove. Hence, we enter the new interval λ ∈ [1
6
, 3
13
] where we obtain a population consisting
of all-Doves, as this strategy dominates. However, mistakes give Hawks a hope for rebirth as
the probability a Dove acting like a Hawk is
q21 = 0.6− 0.6λ.
For example, for λ = 0.2, a Dove will revive a Hawk strategy in 48% cases. As players learn
more, λ falls into the interval ( 3
13
, 2
7
] and a Hawk strategy becomes an ESS, meaning that it is
preferable and the frequency of Hawks starts to grow rapidly. At λ = 2
7
we expect to obtain a
population consisting of all-Hawks. This is a reverse situation to λ = 1
6
, where Hawk acts like
Dove in 50% cases, which preserves the latter from extinction. As species keep learning, the
system falls into the interval of λ > 2
7
where Hawk and Dove stably coexist.
4 Perturbations under incompetence
In this section we provide results that give tips on understanding of the game dynamics when
incompetence is established. As has been illustrated in the Hawk-Dove example, there exist
transition points on the adaptation trajectory that change qualitative characteristics of the
system. Let us define these points as critical values of the incompetence parameter:
Definition 4.1 A critical value of the incompetence parameter, λc, is the bifurcation point of
the replicator dynamics. Then, let Λ be the set of all such critical values of λ.
Bifurcation points occur in dynamics as singular points of the Jacobian matrix. However,
let us also define the set of values of the incompetence parameter when the determinant of the
reward matrix R equals to zero, that is
Definition 4.2 Let Z =
{
λ ∈ [0, 1] | det(R˜(λ)) = 0
}
. We call it the set of singular points of
the incompetent game R˜(λ).
By the definition of a bifurcation, if the system is stable, then in the intervals between λc1
and λc2 the fixed points preserve their qualitative behavior. That is, in order to understand
where the game experiences transitions, we want to find these critical values of the incompetence
parameter. Strictly speaking, fixed points of the incompetent replicator dynamics depend on
the incompetence parameter, that is x˜(λc), however, we will use the simplified notation x˜.
Let us first analyze a fixed point at the vertex i of the simplex Sn. According to [6] the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian for such points are 0 and r˜ji : j 6= i. Hence, when changes in the
incompetence parameter cause changes in the sign of the corresponding elements of the payoff
matrix R˜(λ) we observe changes in stability of such points.
Next consider a fixed point on the edge, i.e. the point x = αei + (1−α)ek, where ei and ek
are the unit basis vectors. That is, at this fixed point we obtain only two survived strategies.
Then, we can easily show that
Lemma 4.1 If:
(a) x˜ = αei + (1− α)ej, where α ∈ (0, 1), is a stable fixed point, and
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(b) λc is a value where φk(λ) = ekR˜(λ)x˜ − x˜R˜(λ)x˜, for some k 6= i, j, changes sign from
< 0 to > 0,
then x˜ changes its qualitative behavior at λc and becomes unstable.
Proof. According to Bomze’s result on the fixed points x˜ = αei + (1− α)ej, [6], the values
φk(λ) = ekR˜(λ)x˜− x˜R˜(λ)x˜, k 6= i, j,
are the eigenvalues of the Jacobian at x˜.
The stability of the fixed point implies that all eigenvalues of the Jacobian have negative
real parts. Hence, the changes in sign of at least one eigenvalue will lead to the changes in
qualitative behavior of the fixed point.

Remark: we should note that Lemma 1 holds for unstable fixed points as well. However,
for these points to change their qualitative behavior to the stable fixed point all φk(λ),∀k 6= i, j
have to become negative.
Next, it is well-known that if x˜ is a fixed point of the replicator dynamics, then
(Jx˜x˜) = −φ(x˜)x˜, (13)
where Jx˜ is a Jacobian matrix evaluated at the fixed point x˜ [6]. We use this fact in order to
continue our analysis.
Let us first notice that we are using a simplified version of the reward matrix from (12).
Next, construct the i-th replicator equation in terms of elements of the n× n reward matrix R˜
and a vector x for k, j = 1, . . . , n:
x˙i = xi
(∑
j 6=i
xjrij −
(∑
j 6=i
xixj(rij + rji) +
∑
l 6=i
∑
k 6=i,l
xlxkrkl
))
. (14)
Consider the general case of the i-th component of Jxx for some vector x:
(Jxx)i = xi
(
2
∑
j 6=i
xjrij −
(
3
∑
j 6=i
xixj(rij + rji) + 3
∑
l 6=i
∑
k 6=i,l
xlxkrkl
))
. (15)
Comparing equations (14) and (15) it follows
(Jx)i = 2xi(fi − φ)− xiφ = 2x˙i − xiφ.
Hence, if x˜ is a fixed point, then x˙i = 0,∀i, and we obtain the required result.
Next, let us analyze the behavior of the incompetent replicator dynamics at the fixed point
x˜ such that
x˙i = x˜i((R˜(λ)x˜)i − x˜T R˜(λ)x˜) = 0,
and in the matrix form we obtain
X˜R˜(λ)x˜ = X˜(x˜T R˜(λ)x˜) = X˜φ(x˜)1 = φ(x˜)x˜,
where X˜ is the diagonal matrix with x˜i on the diagonal. From (13) we obtain
X˜R˜(λ)x˜ = −Jx˜x˜ = φ(x˜)x˜. (16)
Further, let us define λc for which bifurcations of the replicator dynamics occur when the
mean fitness of the population x˜ equals zero in the following way.
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Definition 4.3 Let λc be a balanced bifurcation parameter value of the fixed point x˜ when the
mean fitness φ(x˜, λc) = 0.
We can now formulate the next result.
Lemma 4.2 If x˜ is an interior fixed point, i.e. x˜i > 0,∀i, then every balanced bifurcation
parameter value, λc, is also a singular point of R˜(λ).
Proof. Because φ(x˜, λc) = 0 and x˜ > 0, equation (16) implies that X˜R˜(λc) is singular and
hence
det(X˜R˜(λc)) =
n∏
i=1
xi × det(R˜(λc)) = 0.

Having a fixed point in the interior of the simplex is a nice property, but it is a rare case.
For example, games might possess fixed points on the boundaries of the simplex or one might
even observe heteroclinic cycles. However, using a result by Taylor and Jonker, which says
that for ESS the fitness of extinct strategies is less than the mean fitness of ESS [31], we can
formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 (i) If x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜n−1, 0) is an ESS, then every balanced bifurcation param-
eter value, λc, is also a singular point of R˜(λ).
(ii) If x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜n−1, 0) is not an ESS and λc is a balanced bifurcation parameter value,
then x˜j(λ
c) = 1
n−1 ,∀j 6= n.
Proof of part (i). From (16) we obtain
[R˜(λc)x˜]i =
{
0, ∀i 6= n
fn, i = n.
Suppose R˜(λc)−1 exists. Then
R˜(λc)x˜ = fnen
and
x˜ = fnR˜
−1(λc)en.
Then, by Cramer’s rule,
xj =
|R˜j(λc)|
|R˜(λc)| ,
where R˜j(λ
c) is the same as R˜(λc) except that j-th column is fnen.
As xn = 0 we obtain |R˜n(λc)| = (−1)2nfn|R¯nn(λc)| = 0, where R¯nn(λc) is a corresponding
co-factor. Then,
|R¯nn(λc)| = 0. (17)
Also, ∀j 6= n we obtain x˜j(λc) > 0 and
x˜j(λ
c) = 1|R˜(λc)| ×
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 r12 . . . 0 . . . r1,n−1 r1,n
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
rn,1 rn,2 . . . fn . . . rn,n−1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = (−1)
n+j
|R˜(λc)| |R¯n,j(λc)|. (18)
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Also, the determinant of the reward matrix expanded by the last row gives
|R˜(λc)| =
n−1∑
j=1
(−1)n+jrn,j|R¯n,j(λc)|. (19)
Then, from (18) for each j 6= n, we obtain
(−1)n+j|R¯n,j(λc)| = xj|R˜(λc)|.
Substitute into (19)
|R˜(λc)| =
(
n−1∑
j=1
rn,jxj
)
|R˜(λc)|,
which gives
1 =
n−1∑
j=1
rn,jxj = fn. (20)
Equation (20) is a contradiction as x˜ is an ESS and for xn = 0 we have fn ≤ φ(x˜) = 0.
Proof of part (ii). Furthermore, we can show that if x˜ = (x1, ..., xn−1, 0) is not an ESS and
|R˜(λc)| 6= 0, then fn = 1 and the x˜ point lies in the “center” of the facet xn = 0. That is, from
(20) we know that fn = 1, and from (21) that for each j 6= n we have
0 < xj =
(−1)n+j
|R˜(λc)| |R¯n,j(λ
c)| = rn,j∑n−1
j=1 rn,j
=
1
θ
rn,j, (21)
as
∑n−1
j=1 xj = 1. Substitute (21) in (20) to obtain
1 =
∑n−1
j=1 r
2
n,j∑n−1
j=1 rn,j
,
and hence
n−1∑
j=1
r2n,j =
n−1∑
j=1
rn,j. (22)
Since all rn,j have the same sign by (21), (22) implies that rn,j > 0, j = 1, . . . , n − 1. Then, it
also implies rn,j = 1 for j = 1, . . . , n− 1 and
xj =
1
n− 1 , j = 1, . . . , n− 1. (23)

We considered the extreme cases with an interior equilibrium, with one strategy becoming
extinct and with only one or two strategies surviving. Consideration of other cases is planned
for the future research. However, these results give an easy way to verify if there exists a crucial
transition point on the adaptation trajectory for games with ESS, especially for low-dimensional
systems, that is, n ≤ 3. In order to continue our analysis, we recall a definition from [32].
Definition 4.4 A property of the dynamic system is called robust if it is preserved under small
perturbations.
10
Once we know the nature of bifurcation points, we observe that the number of transitions
in the game is finite in games with n ≤ 3. Let us define a value of λ ∈ (0, 1) after which no
transition is possible where we arrive in the case with sufficiently small perturbations under
incompetence.
Definition 4.5 If there exists δ > 0 such that ||Q(λ) − I|| ≤ δ, where δ depends on λu and
λu = maxλc is the maximal critical value of the incompetence parameter for a fixed point x˜,
then we shall call such perturbations under incompetence sufficiently small perturbations for
this point.
In other words, if we know that there exists λu ∈ [0, 1] sufficiently close to 1, then in
the interval (λu, 1] no bifurcations of the fixed point occur and the game preserves its robust
properties. Hence, if the population is familiar enough with the environment, species are more
likely to behave as in the original game, and the game tends to preserve the same behavioral
habits as the original one. Furthermore, we can formulate the next result.
Theorem 4.3 If the game R˜ possesses an ESS, x˜, and ||Q(λ) − I|| ≤ δ(λu), then the incom-
petent game R˜(λ), when λ ∈ (λu, 1], possesses an ESS, x˜(λ), and
lim
λ→1−
x˜(λ) = x˜. (24)
Proof.
We know that the evolutionary stability of the game implies local stability and resistance
to small perturbations [6, 13, 14].
The fixed point x˜(λ) does not experience any bifurcations when λ > λu. Next, we know
that all real parts of eigenvalues at this point preserve their sign. At λ = 1 we obtain x˜(λ) = x˜,
that is, all eigenvalues of x˜ have negative real parts, hence we obtain that all eigenvalues of x˜(λ)
have negative real parts. This implies that x˜(λ) is hyperbolic, and, hence, the incompetent
replicator dynamics is locally structurally stable.
From the previous statement we obtain that the initial replicator dynamics and incompetent
replicator dynamics for λ > λu are locally topologically equivalent as perturbations under
incompetence are smooth and points are both hyperbolic. Then x˜(λ) is an ESS for R˜(λ) and
hence by [6], for λ > λu
||x˜(λ)− x˜|| < , ∀ > 0.

We should notice that all results obtained in this section describe the evolution of the
strategy choice. However, according to the incompetence matrix Q(λ) for any given λ and
strategy choice, x˜(λ), we observe a stochastic behavior of the species, y˜(λ), affected by their
incompetence as a result of
y˜(λ) = Q(λ)x˜(λ). (25)
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5 Three Strategies: Hawks, Doves and Retaliators (HDR)
Let us next demonstrate our results on the 3-dimensional extension of the Hawk-Dove game.
Imagine that we add a new type of species called “Retaliators” to the system. A Retaliator
behaves as a Hawk against Hawks, as a Dove against Doves and never escalates first. As in
Section 3, species share the same amount of resources b > 0 and when escalating they have a
50% chance of being injured. The payoff matrix then looks as follows:
R =

b−c
2
b b−c
2
0 b
2
b
2
b−c
2
b
2
b
2
 .
For instance, when b = 2 and c = 4:
R =
 −1 2 −10 1 1
−1 1 1
 .
This example was analyzed by Bomze [5] and the flow associated with the replicator equa-
tions for this game is shown in Figure 11. Vertices of the triangle correspond to populations
consisting of only Hawks, Doves or Retaliators. There are two fixed points and one pointwise-
fixed line. The latter corresponds to Doves and Retaliators coexisting, at equilibrium, in all
possible proportions. A pure strategy Hawk, represented by the point [1, 0, 0], is a source. Any
population with initial frequency of Hawks more than 0 will evolve away from this point. A
mixed strategy of Hawks and Doves, represented by [1
2
, 1
2
, 0], is a sink. Hence, any population
with an appropriately small portion of Retaliators will tend to this equilibrium. However, if
the number of Retaliators is sufficiently large, the mixture of Retaliators and Doves becomes
evolutionary desirable and outcompetes the aggressive Hawks. This is a consequence of the
high cost c = 4.
Figure 1: The flow of the HDR-game
1We use the Wolfram Mathematica project [15] in order to draw phase planes for this manuscript.
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This game is a non-robust version of the HDR-game and any small perturbations of the
entries of R might change the behavior of the dynamics. We introduce incompetence in this
case, for example, with the starting level S as follows:
S =

1
2
1
2
0
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
4
1
2
1
4
 .
Then the incompetence matrix for this example is
Q(λ) =

1
2
+ 1
2
λ 1
2
− 1
2
λ 0
1
3
− 1
3
λ 1
3
+ 2
3
λ 1
3
− 1
3
λ
1
4
− 1
4
λ 1
2
− 1
2
λ 1
4
+ 3
4
λ
 . (26)
Now it is easy to derive R˜(λ) from (12) as
R˜(λ) =

0 3
2
λ2 − 1
2
λ −3
2
λ2 − 1
2
λ
λ2 + 1
6
λ+ 1
6
0 −1
8
λ2 + 1
6
λ− 1
24
3
8
λ2 − 1
4
λ− 1
8
1
2
λ2 − 7
12
λ+ 1
12
0
 .
Depending on the value of the incompetence parameter, λ, we obtain different qualitative
behavior of the game dynamics. In particular, the set of critical points is Λ = {0, 1
7
, 1
3
, 1}. These
four critical values λc and three intervals of [0, 1] induced by them determine seven regions with
different qualitative behavior. The game flows for these regions can be found on Figure 2 and
Figure 1 for λ = 1. It is easy to verify that det(R˜(λc)) = 0 for each λc ∈ Λ. Indeed, in this
example Λ = Z (see Definition 2).
Figure 2: The flow for the HDR-game for: A. λ = 0, B. λ = 3
25
, C. λ = 1
7
, D. λ = 1
4
, E. λ = 1
3
,
F. λ = 3
5
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Let us analyze changes in stability properties of the fixed points depending on the incom-
petence parameter. For sufficiently low level of competence we see that a Hawk strategy is
preferable, especially for λ ∈ [0, 1
7
]. However, as species adapt to the environment and improve
their competence, we observe that Retaliator and Dove strategies are competing with the ag-
gressive Hawk behavior. That is, for the low competence, aggressive behavior is more preferable
by natural selection. However, by adapting and improving their competence, species are more
likely to choose less harmful strategies. In the region λ ∈ (1
3
, 1) we obtain a stabilized version
of HDR game. Here Doves out-compete Retaliators: despite the fact that the Dove vertex is
a saddle-point (see Panel (F) in Figure 2), when Retaliators are established they outcompete
Hawks, and then Doves out-compete Retaliators. At λ = 1 we observe an unstable game flow
from Figure 1.
Let us now determine the existence of the ESS in this example. For the interval λ ∈ [0, 1
3
) a
Hawk is the most preferable strategy, furthermore, it is an ESS. As λ approaches 1
3
the Hawk’s
competitive advantage weakens, and when it becomes a source after λ = 1
3
(see Panel (E) and
(F) in Figure 2), any trajectory runs away from this point. For λ > 1
3
the probabilities of other
incidental strategies tend to 0, and a new ESS on the edge corresponding to Hawks-Doves starts
to gain power.
However, as previously mentioned, the evolution of fixed points depending on the incom-
petence parameter established above is a description of the evolution of a strategy choice. Of
course, in nature, it is only possible to observe y˜(λ), namely, the current fixed point x˜(λ),
which depends on the current level of incompetence and is randomized by the effect of the
incompetence matrix Q(λ) (see (25)). That is according to (26) for small λ at the pure-Hawk-
population ESS we may still observe Dove behavior with probability 1
2
− 1
2
λ. The probability
of observing Retaliators is non-zero for larger λ at the ESS on the Hawk-Dove edge (see left
panel on Figure 3), where x˜1(λ), x˜2(λ), x˜3(λ) correspond to the red, blue and green curves,
respectively. The plot of te corresponding y˜1(λ), y˜2(λ), y˜3(λ) probabilities can be found in
Figure 3 (right panel), with the same color scheme.
Figure 3: The frequencies of HDR strategies at the Hawk-Dove edge fixed point (left panel)
and probabilities of meeting HDR strategies at this point (right panel) depending on λ
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6 Conclusions
When populations are unfamiliar with a new environment, it is a natural assumption that
individuals may be prone to behavioral errors. Indeed, this has been observed within a diverse
range of systems, from bacteria utilizing motility genes [1] to language learning for human
beings [16, 17]. In this paper we proposed a generalized theoretical approach to this concept by
incorporating a notion of incompetence into the central concept of evolutionary game theory:
the replicator dynamics.
Under incompetence, by analyzing replicator dynamics, we are analyzing the strategy
choice. Hence, selection may be different to what occurs in the fully competent case. Moreover,
the special structure of perturbations under incompetence contains hints as to where to look
for qualitative changes in evolutionary dynamics. If dynamics are structurally stable, then in-
competence must be reasonably high to affect the evolutionary stable outcome of the dynamics.
However, structural stability is an elegant but rare condition for high-dimensional systems [12].
Hence, even small perturbations of the payoff matrix, corresponding to a small degree of incom-
petence, may affect the selection outcome in real-world systems. Additionally, in nature, we
cannot ask species about their strategy choice. All we can do is to observe their strategy execu-
tion and, according to the incompetence matrix, whenever λ < 1 we encounter stochasticity in
the population behavior. Thus, if some behavioral types become extinct, they may still appear
within the population as a manifestation of their mistakes. This may act as a redundancy,
allowing species to utilize ‘lost’ strategies if they become advantageous again, perhaps, due to
changes in environmental conditions. That is, this implies a ‘memory’ of extinct types may
persist and lead to re-emergence of these types. It would be fascinating to design empirical
experiments within suitable model systems, such as bacterial populations [7, 18, 19, 20], to test
whether this phenomenon can be observed under laboratory conditions.
Here, we made the first step in the direction of introducing evolutionary games under
incompetence. We considered only a one-parameter system with one population of species
interacting. It will be natural to extend this to n-parametrized systems, where each strategy
choice has its own adaptation parameter λi. That is, for the set of n strategies, we could
consider an incompetence vector λ = (λ1, ..., λn), where λi is the adaptation parameter for i-th
behavioral type. Future work could also examine interactions between several populations, or
applications of this theoretical approach within real-world systems.
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